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The present study investigated the developmental foundation of the relation between
social essentialism and attitudes. Forty-eight Jewish Israeli secular 6-year-olds were
exposed to either a story emphasizing essentialism about ethnicity, or stories controlling
for the salience of ethnicity or essentialism per se. After listening to a story, children’s
attitudes were assessed in a drawing and in an IAT task. Compared to the control
conditions, children in the ethnic essentialism condition drew a Jewish and an Arab
character as farther apart from each other, and the Jewish character with a more positive
affect than the Arab character. Moreover, boys in the ethnic essentialism condition
manifested a stronger bias in the IAT. These findings reveal an early link between
essentialism and inter-group attitudes.
Keywords: essentialism, attitudes, social categories, children, ethnicity
Introduction
People essentialize certain social categories. In particular, people believe that certain social
categories capture objective partitions of reality, are composed of homogenous members who
share inherent and unique characteristics, and that membership in the category is biologically
determined and developmentally stable (Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Hirschfeld, 1996; Gelman,
2003). Already in the 50s, Allport (1954) argued that such a construal of social categories likely
underlies, and promotes, intergroup prejudice. In fact, numerous studies have documented that
social essentialism is linked to adults’ tendencies to hold stereotypes, prejudice, and negative
attitudes toward essentialized groups (Yzerbyt et al., 2001; Haslam et al., 2002; Leyens et al., 2003;
Keller, 2005; Prentice and Miller, 2007; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008; Morton et al., 2009).
A number of proposals have been raised in the social psychological literature, attempting
to explain the link between essentialism and attitudes. Among others, it has been suggested
that dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001), group identification (Tajfel, 1982), and
ideologies (Jost et al., 2003), may all serve as important catalysts of the relation. The goal of
the present study was to shed light on this discussion, by examining whether the link between
essentialism and inter-group attitudes is alreadymanifest early in development. The rationale is that
to the extent that this link is evident in young children, then that sets constraints on the plausible
mechanisms accounting for it.
Developmental studies reveal that already prior to entering school, children hold both,
essentialist beliefs about various social groups (e.g., Rhodes and Gelman, 2009; Kinzler and Dautel,
2012), and intergroup biases (e.g., Aboud, 2003; Abrams, 2011; Dunham et al., 2011). However,
although the potential link between the two constructs has indeed been directly hypothesized
(Bigler and Liben, 2007), so far it has been investigated only in correlational studies. In particular,
children’s beliefs about the constancy and stability of racial identity was found significantly related
to both, the extent to which they assign positive traits to their ingroup and negative ones to their
Diesendruck and Menahem Essentialism promotes children’s inter-ethnic bias
outgroup (Rutland et al., 2005), and the extent to which they hold
racial stereotypes—primarily regarding outgroups (Pauker et al.,
2010; see also Levy and Dweck, 1999). Evidently, it is impossible
to draw conclusions about the directionality of the relation, and
thus it is impossible to rule out whether, for instance, children
who are more racially biased, “justify” their bias by adopting
essentialist beliefs. The present study was designed to tackle this
issue more directly by providing an experimental test of this link.
The social category investigated was one that has been proven
highly significant for our target population; namely, ethnicity,
manifested in Israel in terms of the distinction between Jews and
Arabs. Studies have shown that by 4- or 5-years of age, Israeli
Jewish children hold negative attitudes toward Arabs (Bar-Tal
and Teichman, 2005), and start showing evidence of essentialist
beliefs about ethnic categories (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al.,
2011). Given these findings, the present study investigated the
relation between essentialism and attitudes, at the youngest age
in which these phenomena seem to be clearly in place, namely,
6-year-olds.
The experimental method used in the study was adapted
from ones previously used with adults (e.g., Keller, 2005).
Specifically, we told children a story designed to prompt
essentialist thinking about ethnicity, in that it incorporated a
number of the component notions associated with essentialist
beliefs, e.g., that members of different ethnic groups differ in
many fundamental respects, and that ethnic membership is stable
throughout development and inherited from one’s biological
parents. Control stories were included to rule out the possible
effects of sheer exposure to essentialist notions, or the salience
of information about ethnicity. After hearing their corresponding
story, participants were given two tasks to measure their attitudes
toward ethnic groups.
The first attitudes task was a drawing task, in which children
were simply asked to draw a picture of a Jew and an Arab.
Drawing tasks have been used to assess affect-related aspects of
children’s social relationships (Bombi and Pinto, 1994; Teichman,
2001), rendering both quantitative and qualitative indices. The
present study focused on one quantitative and one qualitative
measure, respectively, the distance between the two characters
drawn, and the affective expression of the characters. Regarding
the former, research on adults reveals that the physical distance
between participants and members of an outgroup is indicative
of participants’ attitudes toward the outgroup (Kawakami et al.,
2007; Goff et al., 2008). In a similar vein, research on children
shows that the representation in drawings of the distance between
the child and others is also indicative of the affective quality of
the relationship (Bombi and Pinto, 1994; Holmes, 1997). Thus,
we hypothesized that the stronger children’s inter-ethnic bias, the
farther apart they would draw the outgroup character (i.e., an
Arab) from the ingroup one (a Jew). To ascertain the validity of
this measure, we also assessed the correlation between children’s
responses in it, and a more standard measure of attitudes, namely
the IAT. As for the affective expression of the characters, our
hypothesis was that the stronger the bias, the more negatively
they would draw the Arab character compared to the Jewish one.
The second attitudes task was the Child—Implicit Association
Task (IAT) (Baron and Banaji, 2006). The IAT is a computerized
task that assesses the speed with which a participant responds
to pairings of concepts and evaluative terms. In the present
study, the pairings were between pictures depicting exemplars of
the two ethnic categories—Jews and Arabs—and positive (e.g.,
“good”) or negative (e.g., “bad”) evaluative words. The logic
behind the IAT is that to the extent that people are biased such
that they value ingroups positively and outgroups negatively,
then they should respond faster to bias-consistent pairings (e.g.,
Jew-good or Arab-bad, for a Jewish participant) than to bias-
inconsistent pairings (e.g., Jew-bad or Arab-good).
In general, our main hypotheses were that children exposed
to the story endorsing ethnic essentialism—compared to those
exposed to the control stories—would: (a) draw a Jewish and an
Arab character as farther apart from each other; (b) draw an Arab
character more negatively than a Jewish character, and (c) show
a larger difference in response time between bias-consistent and
bias-inconsistent trials in the IAT.
Methods
Participants
Participants in the present study were 48 secular Jewish Israeli 6-
year-olds (M = 6 years 6 months, range = 5.9–7.1; 24 girls). All
children lived in cities consisting almost exclusively of Jews, and
attended exclusively Jewish non-religious public schools. Only
children with signed parental permission participated. Children
received a small gift in gratitude for their participation.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-
subjects conditions, defined by the “priming story” they were
exposed to: Ethnic Essentialism, Ethnic Mention, and Animal
Essentialism (n = 16, per condition). There were no significant
differences in the mean ages or gender distribution among
conditions.
Materials
All materials and procedures were approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychology.
Priming Stories
Three different stories were elaborated: a target story and two
“control” stories. The target story was the Ethnic Essentialism
story. The story emphasized various aspects of essentialism,
such as the notions that ethnicity is inherited and stable
throughout development, and that members of ethnic categories
are homogenous and distinct from members of another ethnic
category. The story described two boys, a Jew and an Arab, in
counterbalanced order of presentation across participants. The
Ethnic Mention story was elaborated to provide a control for the
salience of ethnicity in the target story. The story described a
boy—with no defined ethnicity—who while searching for his lost
dog in a park, encountered a number of people whose ethnic
membership was explicitly described (i.e., “Jew” and “Arab”).
Thus, in this story, ethnic labels were mentioned the same
number of times (8 each ethnicity) as in the Ethnic Essentialism
story (see the Appendix for these two stories). The Animal
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Essentialism story was elaborated to provide a control for the
sheer triggering of essentialism. The story had the same structure
as the Ethnic Essentialism story, but instead of describing the
lives of two boys from different ethnicities, it described the lives
of two animals from different species (a giraffe and an elephant).
As a manipulation check, we read the Ethnic Essentialism
and the Ethnic Mention stories to another group of 20 six-year-
olds (10 each), and asked them a series of questions assessing
their beliefs about components of ethnic essentialism expressed
in the Ethnic Essentialism story. The questions were taken from
the Essentialism Components Questionnaire (ECQ; Deeb et al.,
2011), and had to do with: (1) the distinctiveness of Jews and
Arabs—i.e., how differently Jews and Arabs think, behave, and
look (1 = not all, to 4 = a lot), and (2) the inheritability of
ethnic membership—i.e., if it is possible for someone born to
parents of ethnicity A (e.g., Arab) to become someone from
ethnicity B (e.g., Jew), and if it is possible for a mother from
ethnicity A (e.g., Arab) to give birth to a baby who is from
ethnicity B (e.g., Jew) (1 = very possible, to 4 = completely
impossible). Confirming the manipulation, a MANOVA with the
scores on these two components entered as dependent-variables
revealed that children who heard the Ethnic Essentialism story
had a higher overall essentialism score (M = 3.28, SD =
0.37) than those who heard the Ethnic Mention story (M =
2.69, SD = 0.45), F(1, 17) = 5.14, p < 0.05, η
2
= 0.38.
Interestingly, although component type did not interact with
story type, the largest difference between stories regarded the
inheritability component (M = 4.00, SD = 0.00; and M =
3.18, SD = 1.08, for Ethnic Essentialism and Ethnic Mention,
respectively).
Drawing Task
Each participant was given a white A4 sheet of paper and 6
colored pencils, and was asked to draw a Jew and an Arab (in
counterbalanced order across participants). Two measures were
coded for analyses by two coders blind to the Priming Story
children had heard. The first was the distance in centimeters
between the two characters, measured with a ruler from the
closest points of each character. The second measure was the
affect of each of the characters, as manifested in their facial
expressions. This variable was coded as expressing positive (3),
neutral (2), or negative (1) affect, and agreement between coders
was perfect. The dependent measures were the affective scores
regarding Arab (affect-toward-Arab) and Jewish (affect-toward-
Jew) characters.
IAT Task
Each participant completed a version of the Child IAT, using
ethnicity rather than race as a social category (Baron and Banaji,
2006). The task was presented to children as a “computer game,”
in which after seeing pictures on a laptop screen or hearing
certain words, they would have to press two different buttons
as quickly as possible. To facilitate children’s performance,
they responded by pressing two large mouse-like buttons—
one blue and one yellow—connected to the laptop computer
(see Figure 1). Moreover, the laptop screen was marked with
FIGURE 1 | Picture of the experimental set-up for the IAT.
two distinct frames on each side—one blue and one yellow—
matching the buttons on its side.
The pictures used for the task were of stereotypically
dressed Jewish and Arab men with neutral or positive affective
expressions (equally distributed between the two ethnicities).
Jewish men were all orthodox, thus wearing a yarmulke, a black
hat, or religious attire. Arab men were all portrayed wearing a
head shawl (kaffiah). Four different pictures of each ethnicity
were displayed throughout the task. The pictures were all males
because the visual distinction between Jewish and Arab women
is more ambiguous than between men. The positive evaluative
words used were: fun, good, happy, and nice; the negative
ones were: disgusting, bad, angry, and mean. The words were
pre-recorded by a female adult, and children heard them via
headphones, which they wore during the entire IAT task. All
words are highly familiar to children this age.
The structure of the IAT task was identical to the one in Baron
and Banaji (2006), and included 7 stages. In all stages, the move
from one trial to the next occurred only after children pressed
the correct button. Stage 1 was a training stage for the sorting
of the pictures. Children were told that they would be seeing
pictures of either Arabs or Jews in the center of the screen, and
that they were to press the blue button as quickly as they could
when the picture was of an Arab, and the yellow button when
the picture was of a Jew. To help children remember the rule,
in this stage, small pictures of an Arab and a Jew appeared on
their corresponding halves of the screen. Stage 1 consisted of 20
trials, half of each kind, presented in random order. Children
indeed succeeded in identifying the ethnicities of the pictures
quite well. Stage 2 consisted of a training for the sorting of the
evaluative words. Children were told that they would be hearing
words through the headphones, some of them good and some
of them bad. Children were instructed to press the blue button
if they heard a bad word, and the yellow button if they heard a
good word. To remind children of the instructions in this stage,
small pictures of a sad and a happy “Smiley” faces appeared on
their corresponding halves of the screen. Stage 2 too consisted of
20 trials, half of each kind, presented in random order.
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Stage 3 required children to respond to the two types of
stimuli—pictures and words—by pressing the same buttons they
had been trained on in Stages 1 and 2. Namely, children were
told that they would either see a picture of an Arab or a
Jew, or they would hear a bad or a good word. If the picture
was of an Arab or the word was bad, they had to press the
blue button. If the picture was of a Jew or the word was
good, they had to press the yellow button. Stage 3 consisted
of 20 trials, a quarter of each kind (5 pictures of Jews, 5
of Arabs; 5 positive words, 5 negative), presented in random
order. Stage 4 constituted one of the critical test stages, in
which the strength of the associations between Jew-good and
Arab-bad was assessed. This stage was identical to Stage 3, but
consisted of 40 trials, a quarter of each kind, presented in random
order.
In Stage 5, children were trained on the reversed association to
the one displayed in the previous stages. The stage was identical
to Stage 2 described above, but this time children were instructed
to press the blue button (i.e., the same button for “Arabs”) when
they heard good words, and the yellow button (i.e., the same
button for “Jews”) when they heard bad words. Stage 5 consisted
of 20 trials, half of each kind, presented in random order. Stages
6 (training) and 7 (test) were identical to Stages 4 and 5, except
now the same buttons had to be pressed for inconsistent pairings
(i.e., blue button for either Arab or good, yellow button for either
Jew or bad).
Half of the participants performed the IAT task in the order of
the stages described above. In other words, they were first trained
and tested in pairings of pictures and evaluative words consistent
with an ethnic bias, and then trained and tested on inconsistent
pairings. For the other half of the participants, the order of stages
was reversed, such that they were first trained and tested on
inconsistent-pairings, and then on consistent ones. Specifically,
this latter group of participants performed Stages 5–7 before
Stages 2–4.
The dependent measure was a D-score (Greenwald et al.,
2003), consisting of the weighted average of: (1) the difference
between the average response time to inconsistent-pairings test
trials (Stage 7) and the average response time to consistent-
pairings test trials (Stage 4), divided by the pooled standard
deviation in the pertinent stages, and (2) the corresponding
difference in the respective training stages (Stages 6 and 3).
Following the interpretation of previous research on the Child-
IAT (Baron and Banaji, 2006), the higher the D-score, the
longer it took participants to respond to inconsistent than
to consistent pairings, and thus the stronger the intergroup
bias.
Procedure
Children were tested individually by an experimenter in a
quiet room in their school. All participants went through
the same sequence of tasks: (1) Priming story, (2) Drawing
task, and (3) IAT. At the end of all tasks, the experimenter
engaged the child in a brief informal conversation about
how Jews and Arabs actually do live together in many
places, work together, and have similar interests and
activities.
Results
Preliminary Analyses of Control Conditions
Given that our hypotheses referred to potential differences
between the Ethnic Essentialism story and the two Control
stories, prior to the analyses addressing the hypotheses, we
compared children’s responses in the two Control stories only.
ANOVAs on the four main dependent-measures, i.e., distance,
affect-toward-Arab, and affect-toward-Jew in the Drawing task,
and D-score in the IAT, revealed no significant differences
between the Ethnic Mention and the Animal Essentialism stories
(on distance: M = 4.56, SD = 3.57, and M = 3.69,
SD = 3.00; on affect-toward-Arab: M = 2.87, SD = 0.35,
and M = 2.75, SD = 0.45; on affect-toward-Jew: M =
2.87, SD = 0.35, and M = 2.76, SD = 0.44; and on
D-scores: M = 0.00, SD = 0.14, and M = −0.05, SD =
0.17; for Ethnic Mention and Animal Essentialism, respectively,
all ps > 0.2). For this reason, in the main analyses we




Due to experimenter’s error, one child’s drawing (from the
Animal Essentialism condition) was misplaced, and so distance
was analyzed for 47 children. An ANOVA with Priming story
(Ethnic Essentialism, Controls), and Gender as between-subjects
factors, using the distance between characters as the dependent
measure revealed only a significant effect of Priming story,
F(1, 43) = 4.24, p < 0.05, η
2
= 0.09. Namely, children exposed
to the Ethnic Essentialism story (M = 6.51, SD = 4.45) drew the
two characters as farther apart than did children exposed to the
Control stories (M = 4.14, SD = 3.28).
Affect
A repeated-measures ANOVA with Priming story (Ethnic
Essentialism, Controls) and Gender as between-subjects factors,
and Character (Arab, Jew) as within-subjects factor, using the
affect scores as the dependent measures, revealed a significant
effect of Character, F(1, 43) = 4.73, p < 0.05, η
2
= 0.1, and
a significant interaction between Character and Priming story,
F(1, 43) = 4.73, p < 0.05, η
2
= 0.1. Follow-up t-tests revealed
that whereas Priming story did not have a significant effect on
affect-toward-Arab (p > 0.5), children exposed to the Ethnic
Essentialism story had significantly more positive affect-toward-
Jew scores than those exposed to the Control stories, t(31) = 2.68,
p < 0.05 (see Figure 2).
IAT Task
Greenwald et al. (2003) recommended dropping from analyses
adult participants who responded faster than in 300ms on at least
10% of the trials—i.e., participants who seemed to be responding
before fully processing the stimuli. Applying this criterion would
have led to dropping 25% of our initial sample, and so we
set the criterion at 15% of trials instead, leaving us with the
sample of 48 children. An ANOVA with Priming story (Ethnic
Essentialism, Controls), and Gender as between-subjects factors
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FIGURE 2 | Affective bias as a function of Priming story and character
ethnicity. 1, negative; 2, neutral; 3, positive. Error bars indicate SEs.
on participants’ D-scores revealed a significant effect of Gender,
F(1, 44) = 13.89, p < 0.005, η
2
= 0.24, and a significant
interaction between Gender and Priming story, F(1, 44) = 8.86,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.17. Follow-up ANOVAs on each Gender
revealed that the effect of Priming story was significant only
among boys, F(1, 22) = 4.66, p < 0.05, η
2
= 0.18, such that boys’
D-score was higher after hearing the Ethnic Essentialism story
(M = 0.13, SD = 0.17) than the Control stories (M = −0.01,
SD = 0.14). This pattern did not seem to result from an
irregular distribution of participants: 7 of the 8 boys who heard
the Ethnic Essentialism story had positive D-scores, compared
to 9 of the 16 who heard the Control stories. [An ANOVA
identical to the one described above using the 10% criterion,
also revealed a significant interaction between Priming story
and Gender, F(1, 33) = 9.52, p < 0.005, which derived from
the fact that Priming story only affected boys, F(1, 16) = 9.63,
p < 0.01.]
Relation between Measures
In a final analysis, we looked at the relation between the two
continuous measures used in the different tasks, i.e., distance
in centimeters and D-score. Given the findings from the IAT,
we conducted correlations separately for girls and boys. These
analyses revealed that the correlation was significant only among
boys (r = 0.51, p < 0.05). Namely, the farther apart boys drew
the Jewish and Arab characters, the stronger was their implicit
ethnic bias. This finding suggests that these two measures indeed
tapped onto children’s ethnic attitudes.
Discussion
The present study revealed that experimentally reinforcing an
essentialist construal of ethnicity influenced Israeli Jewish 6-year-
olds’ attitudes toward ethnicity. This effect was found beyond
simply making ethnicity or essentialism salient, and in very
distinct measures.
In a drawing task, children drew Jewish and Arab characters
as farther apart from each other after hearing the Ethnic
Essentialism story, than after hearing control stories. Thus,
consistent with adults’ responses to physical distance (Kawakami
et al., 2007; Goff et al., 2008), and children’s representations of
social distance (Bombi and Pinto, 1994; Holmes, 1997), children
who heard an essentialism-enforcing story represented Jews and
Arabs as distant from each other. Although the assessment
here was of children’s depictions of distance, it is possible that,
as in adults, there would be a correspondence between this
represented distance, and the enactment of distance in real-life
encounters (e.g., Williams and Eberhardt, 2008; Morton et al.,
2009).
The findings regarding the effect of story on the affective
expression of the drawn characters corroborated the above
findings on distance. Namely, children who heard the Ethnic
Essentialism story showed a stronger affective bias in favor of
their ingroup than children who heard the Control stories. One
of the main questions in the field of intergroup cognition has to
do with whether the formation and conceptualization of social
categories is driven by a need to affiliate with those who are
like oneself, or to avoid those who are unlike oneself (e.g.,
Cosmides et al., 2003). Putting it differently, are intergroup biases
driven by a positive bias toward ingroups or a negative bias
toward outgroups (or both)? Studies on children’s racial attitudes
indicate that ingroup favoritism may developmentally precede
outgroup derogation (Aboud, 2003; Buttelmann and Böhm,
2014). Consistent with this pattern, we found that compared
to the Control conditions, the affective bias generated by the
Ethnic Essentialism story appeared to result primarily frommore
positive valuation of ingroups, without a corresponding negative
valuation of outgroups.
The effect of the essentialism story on IAT responses was
found only among boys. Again, those exposed to the Ethnic
Essentialism story showed a stronger implicit bias than those
exposed to the Control stories. One possible reason for the
fact that the effect of the essentialism manipulation on IAT
performance was not as comprehensive is that, given the order of
the tasks—the IAT coming after the drawing task—the effect of
the story might have waned by the time children performed the
IAT. Evidently this still cannot explain why this decline would
have occurred more strongly for girls than for boys—though
given the particularity of this finding, one should exercise caution
in interpreting it. Nonetheless, one speculative explanation for
this gender effect is that males are arguably more prone to
intergroup biases than females (Navarrete et al., 2010), a pattern
that seems to be manifested even among children (Geary et al.,
2003). In fact, recent studies reveal that boys may have stronger
intergroup biases than girls (Fehr et al., 2008; Buttelmann and
Böhm, 2014; Benozio and Diesendruck, 2015). In general, it is
important to remark that the IAT scores were also informative, in
that they provided corroboration for the validity of the distance
measure.
More generally, one theoretical implication of the present
findings is that whatever drives the relation between essentialism
and attitudes, it is already present among 6-year-olds. For
instance, it has been argued that the relation may be driven
by dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001), group
identification (Tajfel, 1982), and political views (Jost et al.,
2003). Developmental psychologists have been examining the
emergence of some of these motivational constructs among
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children (Nesdale et al., 2005; Baron and Banaji, 2009;
Killen et al., 2013), and thus a future integration of such
factors to the study of essentialism and attitudes should be
fruitful. Alternatively, others have argued that the relation
between essentialism and intergroup bias derives from primary
evolutionary motives (Cosmides et al., 2003). Future studies
should attempt to address this alternative by examining
even younger children than the ones tested here (see for
instance, Buttelmann et al., 2013; Powell and Spelke, 2013),
or assessing children in different cultures. In this latter
regard, it is noteworthy that the extent to which children
essentialize particular social categories (Diesendruck et al., 2013),
and the extent to which they manifest implicit and explicit
intergroup attitudes (Pauker et al., 2010), likely differ across
cultures.
Finally, a practical implication of these findings is that
if one is interested in reducing the emergence of negative
attitudes toward particular groups, then it might be fruitful
to target interventions at the primary—essentialist—beliefs
potentially catalyzing such attitudes, already early on in
development. The optimistic outlook in this regard is that there
are strategies that have proven to work in reducing young
children’s social essentialism. In particular, showing children that
people’s characteristics fall within continua rather than being
all-or-none (Master et al., 2012), using non-generic language to
describe people (Cimpian and Markman, 2011; Rhodes et al.,
2012), and having children interact daily and collaboratively
with members of another group (Rutland et al., 2005; Deeb
et al., 2011), have all been shown to reduce essentialist-like
beliefs. The experimental link between essentialism and attitudes
demonstrated here provides substantive support for such
interventions.
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“I’m going to tell you a story about two boys: Hasan and Eyal.
Hasan was born to Arab parents and therefore he is also an Arab.
He grew up in a village where all the people are Arabs. In Hasan’s
village, everybody speaks Arabic and do the same things. For
instance, every Friday afternoon they go to the village’s mosque
to pray together to the God of the Arabs, and the adult men wear
a keffiah on their heads. Hasan already wants to be a grown-up
so he too can wear a keffiah. Hasan loves his family, especially
his two older brothers, who got married to Arab women and
they now have cute children, who are Arabs of course, and with
whomHasan likes to play. Hasan dreams that 1 day he too will get
married, have children, and everybody will keep growing together
as Arabs, speaking Arabic, and living in the Arab village.
In another city lives Eyal. Eyal was born to Jewish parents and
therefore he is Jewish. Only Jews live in Eyal’s city. They don’t
speak Arabic, don’t go to mosques, and don’t wear keffiahs on
their heads. In Eyal’s city, everybody speaks Hebrew, and they go
to the synagogue to pray to the God of the Jews. Eyal loves his
family. Eyal’s mother is pregnant and soon he is going to have a
little sister. Of course she is also going to be Jewish. Eyal dreams
that he and his sister will grow up to be close siblings, and they
too will have Jewish children, and they will all grow up together
as Jews, speaking Hebrew, and living in the Jewish city.”
Ethnic Mention
“One day, a boy went out to look for his lost dog. The boy went
out with his mother to the park next to his house. The first man
they encountered in the park was a Jew. The boy asked the Jewish
man: ‘Excuse me sir, did you see a little black and white dog
walking alone?’ The Jewish man thought for a second and then
replied: ‘No, I didn’t. Perhaps you should ask that Arab man who
is eating an apple.’ The boy and his mother left the Jewish man
and went to ask the Arab man who was eating the apple. ‘Excuse
me sir, do you know where I can find me dog? He is black and
white.’ The Arab man thought and then said: ‘I’m sorry but I
didn’t see a black and white dog. May be you can ask that Arab
woman sitting over there reading the newspaper.’ The boy and his
mother left the Arab man and went toward the Arab woman who
was sitting reading the newspaper. The boy asked her: ‘Excuse
me ma’m, I’m looking for my dog. Did you see him passing by?’
The Arab woman looked at the boy and said: ‘I haven’t seen any
dogs here. You should ask that Jewish woman who is pushing a
stroller.’ The boy left the Arab woman and went running toward
the Jewish woman who was pushing a stroller. ‘Excuse me miss,
perhaps you have seen my dog?’ ‘No, I haven’t,’ answered the
Jewish woman. At this point, the boy’s mother told him: ‘We
should go home. Our dog is very smart, so perhaps he found his
way back.’ The mother and the boy left the Jewish woman and
went back home.When they got there, they found the dogwaiting
by the door. The boy gave his dog a big hug, and he was very
happy. He said: ‘From now on, we will always go out together.’”
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